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Teaching Constitutional Law: Homage to Clio 
David P. Bryden* 
Constitutional Law is a required course in the typical law 
school curriculum. Yet relatively few students will ever litigate 
first amendment or equal protection cases; and by the time they 
do so the law may well have changed dramatically. What then is 
the point of the course? 
Most of us would answer that our goal is not so much to pre-
pare students for practice as to give them a liberal education in 
law. Our graduates become judges and governors, authors and 
reformers. They are pillars of the community, with an extraordi-
nary role in public affairs. Therefore, every lawyer ought to ap-
preciate our constitutional heritage. This, more than any other 
rationale, justifies a long, required course in constitutional law. 
One implication of this rationale is that our students should 
learn constitutional history. Any compelling reason for studying 
contemporary constitutional dilemmas is an even better reason for 
studying their origins, their relations to major currents in Ameri-
can life, and the lives of the greatest Justices. 
How well do we achieve these larger purposes? Under the 
auspices of the American Bar Foundation, I composed several 
problems designed to measure students' legal analytical skills.t 
These tests were given to samples of the third-year classes at three 
distinguished law schools.2 At each school the students who par-
ticipated had, on the average, somewhat better academic records 
than their class as a whole. At the last minute, I added several 
multiple-choice questions about famous twentieth-century 
• Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. My colleagues John Cound and 
Daniel Farber provided useful advice about several points in this essay. 
I. The results of that study will be published in 1984. It will discuss the method-
ological details such as how the students were selected in greater detail than seems neces-
sary here. I am grateful to the ABF's Executive Director, John Heinz, for permission to 
publish the constitutional quiz separately, and to the ABF for providing the funds for the 
project. 
2. All three would be at least plausible candidates for inclusion on a list of the best 
twenty law schools, though not near the very top of the list. I assured them of anonymity in 
order to obtain the fullest administrative cooperation. I did indeed obtain it, and for this I 
am indebted to several individuals who must be nameless here. 
About forty students took the test at each school. 
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Supreme Court Justices,3 on the hunch that some of the answers 
would be interesting. 
Here are the results. 
1. Asked whether Harlan F. Stone ''was a member of the 
Warren Court's liberal wing," only a few students (3%, 12%, and 
13% of those who took the test at the three schools) answered in 
the affirmative. Another alternative, that he "generally voted 
against New Deal legislation that came before the Supreme Court 
in the thirties," received the votes of 24%, 42%, and 21% of the 
students. The most attractive false proposition, that he "was a 
New Deal Democrat, appointed to the Supreme Court by FDR," 
got 54%, 35%, and 45% of the votes. "None of the above" was 
chosen by only 19%, 12%, and 21%. 
Conceivably, a few students were confused by the fact that 
FDR selected Stone to be Chief Justice. Still, it seems clear that 
most of them did not understand the relationship between Stone's 
political beliefs and his judicial performance. I wonder whether 
we ought to discuss judicial restraint, surely a pervasive topic in 
every Constitutional Law course, without historical examples, in-
cluding (in their varying fashions and degrees) Stone, Holmes and 
Brandeis. Should we leave students with the impression that 
when these Justices dissented from the Old Guard's decisions it 
was generally because all three simply favored the legislation be-
ing challenged? 
2. The next question confirmed that many students were in-
deed ignorant of the history of the controversy about judicial re-
straint. They were asked whether Holmes, Frankfurter, both, or 
neither "is generally thought of as an advocate of 'judicial re-
straint.'" Holmes (alone) was selected by 19%, 37%, and 22%. 
Frankfurter alone got votes from 38%, 37%, and 43%. "Neither" 
was marked by 22%, 16%, and 12%. The rest said "both." Thus, 
at each of the schools a majority rejected the association between 
Holmes and advocacy of judicial restraint; at one school a major-
ity also rejected this characterization of Frankfurter. 
The explanation, perhaps, is that most students forget the 
Lochner dissent (it won't be on the exam) and have encountered 
no other memorable examples of Holmes's deference to legislative 
3. l asked ten questions. two of which l subsequently discarded as unfair. One of 
the discarded questions contained the proposition that Charles Evans Hughes "was one of 
the conservative justices who consistently voted against New Deal legislation in the 
Supreme Court." l meant this to be false, but have decided that "consistently" is too am-
biguous. (On the same question, 24%, 21% and 19% indicated that he "was Chief Justice 
during the years of the Eisenhower Presidency," while 3%, 21% and 8% thought that he 
"was a famous constitutional lawyer though not a judge.") 
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judgments. They probably recall some of his vivid first amend-
ment opinions, and many may think of Holmes as William 0. 
Douglas with a mustache. They are less confused about Frank-
furter, presumably because his quarrels with Warren Court activ-
ists are a prominent part of the typical casebook-a rather ironical 
result, since Frankfurter's behavior was more ambivalent than 
Holmes's. 
3. Concerning Holmes's social beliefs, I changed the ques-
tion after results at the first school revealed that 84% knew he had 
written "a famous book about the common law." At this school, 
no one said that he "believed as a private citizen that preventing 
war was mankind's most urgent priority;" 5% chose the assertion 
that he "believed that more equitable distribution of wealth 
should be one of America's major domestic priorities;" and II% 
checked "none of above." 
At the other two schools, I substituted "both of above" for 
"wrote a famous book .... " At one of these schools a majority 
checked either "preventing war" (8%), "more equitable distribu-
tion of wealth" (20%) or "both of above" (32% ). At the third 
school, most (62%) chose "none of above," and the most popular 
mistake ("preventing war" -19%) was hardly shocking. 
4. The students were asked whether Earl Warren "advo-
cated, during World War II, that Americans of Japanese ancestry 
be interned in special camps," or "had been governor of Califor-
nia," or both or neither. "Neither" got the votes of 30%, 44%, and 
12%. "Both" was chosen by 48%, 28%, and 58%. If we add the 
"both" votes to the votes for the detention camp alternative, we 
find that 54%,35%, and 81% were aware of his advocacy of intern-
ment. Most knew that he had been a governor of California: 
65%, 49%, and 64%. 
5. Most students (62%, 53%, 69%) knew that William H. 
Taft "was a Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court." A 
few (8%, 7%, and 8%) thought that he "was, in his time, one of the 
leading advocates of )udicial restraint.' " Another small group 
(8%, 9%, 8%) identified Taft as "one of the 'Nine Old Men' who 
usually (though not always) voted to strike down New Deal legis-
lation." Fairly substantial minorities (22%, 30%, 15%) decided 
that he "was a President who appointed some conservative justices 
but did not himself serve on the Court.'' 
6. Asked whether Hugo Black "was a Southerner," or 
"joined Brandeis in several first amendment dissents," or both, or 
neither, the students responded as follows. That he was a South-
erner: 30%, 28%, and 38%. That he joined Brandeis in several 
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first amendment dissents: 8%, 28%, and 10%. That both proposi-
tions were true: 32%, 23%, and 33%. Thus, sizeable minorities-
at one excellent school 49%--were unaware of Justice Black's 
southern origin; and at least forty percent at each school thought 
of him as upholding civil liberties with Brandeis.4 
Is this so surprising? Many law students majored in music, 
accounting or some other field unrelated to American history. At 
law school they have little incentive to pay close attention to the 
dates of opinions, much less the biographies of leading jurists. 
7. The students were well-informed about certain aspects of 
Justice Frankfurter's life. Given the propositions that he "was 
both Jewish and an immigrant to the United States," that he "had 
been a law professor," both of the above or neither of the above, 
most (83%, 53%, 69%) chose "both of the above''-not a bad per-
formance, since they might have been expected to be unaware that 
he was an immigrant, if not that he was a former professor. 
8. The next question asked whether Brandeis "believed 
that, since modern capitalism requires large corporations, we also 
need a larger Federal Government to regulate the economy," or 
that "technical barriers to constitutional litigation like 'standing' 
rules are generally excessively formalistic excuses for avoiding the 
socio-economic merits of cases," or both, or neither of the above. 
Substantial minorities (41%, 33%, and 20o/o) correctly said that he 
entertained neither belief.s That he believed both propositions 
was the view of 30o/o, 19%, and 33%. Adding to these the handful 
who singled out big government as the true answer, we find that 
35%, 28%, and 42% were unaware of Brandeis's strictures about 
the curse of bigness. By a similar process, we learn that majorities 
of 54%, 59%, and 72% mistakenly thought that he disliked rules 
limiting access to the courts. 
Since there was no penalty for guessing, these figures presum-
ably exaggerate the students' understanding. Be that as it may, 
their performance was spotty. I think. we can safely assume that 
they would not have done better in response to more sophisticated 
questions. In any case, shouldn't we reconsider the purposes of 
the course? It will be said that we haven't enough time to cover 
much history. If that is so, wouldn't it make more sense to have a 
required first-year course in constitutional history, followed by 
4. In view of the brief overlap of their terms, this part of the question was fiawed, 
although it seems unlikely that the results were significantly affected. 
5. John Cound has unsuccessfully tried to persuade me that this question was unfair, 
on the grounds that a respondent is entitled to concentrate on the conclusion (about big 
government) rather than the preceding proposition about big business (l disagree) and this 
latter proposition (as of. say, 1932) cannot be called simply true or false. 
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upper-class electives on contemporary doctrine?6 Which is more 
important for our graduates to know, the current list of "suspect 
classifications" or the saga of legal oppression and emancipation? 
The latest dirty movie decision, or the battle over Ulysses? More 
interpretations of the tenth amendment, or the lives and thoughts 
of Black and Warren, Stone and Frankfurter, Holmes and 
Brandeis? 
6. General courses in legal history, while desirable, would not be an adequate sub-
stitute for the course I envision on the development of fundamental rights, although the 
latter might well include English antecedents of our rights, as well as some comparative 
law. A better approach would be to prescribe certain prelaw courses including constitu-
tional history. That might be my choice if legal education required only two years. But in 
the context of a three-year curriculum, with considerable inefficiency in our teaching meth-
ods, it is more difficult to justify mandatory prelaw studies. 
